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PROVIDENCE, ETERNITY, AND 
HUMAN FREEDOM: A REPLY TO 
STUMP AND KRETZMANN 
David Widerker 
In this paper, I respond to Eleonore Stump's and Norman Kretzmann's de-
fense of eternalism against an objection of mine in 'A Problem For the 
Eternity Solution.' There I argued that, insofar as eternalism is intended as a 
strategy of avoiding the conclusion of the argument against freedom from divine 
foreknowledge to the effect that the traditional theist is committed to the violation 
of the principle of the fixity of the past, it does not succeed. I discuss two attempts 
by Stump and Kretzmann to reject this claim and argue that they are unsatisfac-
tory. Finally, I sketch what seems to me the most promising line of defence that 
an eternalist might adopt in order to deal with the problem I raise. 
There is a well-known argument which purports to show that divine fore-
knowledge is incompatible with human freedom.l The argument proceeds 
from the assumption that God has foreknowledge of all facts to the conclusion 
that if humans are free to do otherwise than what they in fact do, then thy 
also have power to bring about the non-obtaining of certain facts about the 
past, specifically, facts regarding God's foreknowledge of how a free agent 
acts in the future. Since this conclusion constitutes a violation of the principle 
of the fixity of the past (henceforth "PFP"), it is concluded that divine fore-
knowledge and human freedom are incompatible. One way of resisting this 
argument, sometimes referred to as "The Eternity Solution" is to deny the 
assumption that God has foreknowledge of facts. The eternalist claims that 
God exists outside time, and hence is not subject to temporal predication. 
Although God does not have foreknowledge, he still is omniscient. But the 
mode of his knowledge is atemporaI.2 This being the case, the eternalist 
contends that the only conclusion that one is justified to draw from the fact 
that human agents can act otherwise, is that such agents have it within their 
power to bring about the non-obtaining of certain atemporal facts regarding 
God's (atemporal) knowledge of how such agents act at a given point in time. 
And this conclusion does not violate PFP. 
In an earlier article,3 I presented a difficulty for the Eternity Solution. I 
argued that given a certain plausible assumption regarding God's providential 
activity in the world: 
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(1) It is logically possible for God sometimes to intervene in human his-
tory in the light of his knowledge of future contingent events, 
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the proponent of the Eternity Solution still seems to be committed to the 
violation of PFP. My argument was this. 
Suppose that God knows that Jack freely pulls the trigger at TS, with the 
intention of killing Smith. Suppose further that wanting to save Smith, God 
reveals this fact to Smith at T3 by causing him to hear at T3 a voice telling 
him about what is going to happen. As a result, Smith by taking appropriate 
precautions is able to save his life. Now the etemalist concedes that if Jack 
has it within his power at T4 to refrain from his attempt to kill Smith, he also 
has the power at T4 to make it the case that God does not know that he 
attempts to kill Smith at TS. On the other hand, we may assume that God's 
knowing that Jack attempts to kill Smith at TS is a condition which, in the 
circumstances, is causally necessary for the occurrences of the event of 
Smith's hearing at T3 a voice telling him that Jack will attempt to kill him. 
It seems plausible to suppose that had God not known that Jack attempts to 
kill Smith at TS, he would not have told Smith that Jack will try to kill him, 
and hence, Smith would not have heard the voice he in fact heard.4 But then 
it follows that by having the power to bring about the non-obtaining of that 
condition, Jack can also be said to have the power at T4 to bring about the 
non-obtaining of such genuine past facts as: 
XT3: That Smith heard at T3 a voice telling him that Jack will attempt to 
kill him. 
YT3: That Smith came to believe at T3 that Jack will attempt to kill him, etc. 
The intuitive principle underlying the last inference is this: 
If P is the case, and q is a causally necessary condition (in the circumstances) 
for p, and an agent X has it within his power at T to make it the case that 
(not-q), then X has it also within his power at T to make it the case that 
(not-p). 
An assumption such as (1) seems to me to be acceptable on intuitive grounds. 
It seems to me plausible to assume that God has the power to warn Smith 
against Jack's attempt to kill him, without this having the consequence that, 
in case He exercises this power, Jack's attempt to kill Smith ceases to be a 
free action. I also claimed that (1) seems to get support from various cases 
of biblical prophecy.s 
I 
In a recent article,6 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (henceforth 
referred to as 'S-K') have responded to my objection. In their reply, they are 
concerned with a somewhat restricted version of (1), i.e. 
(1') It is logically possible for God sometimes to intervene in human his-
tory in the light of his knowledge of a certain future contingent event, 
and tell a human agent about the occurrence of that event. 
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They seem to agree with me that the acceptance of (1') commits the etemalist 
to the violation of PFP. Their way out is to reject (1') by way of adopting 
(2) Necessarily, whenever God reveals to a human agent that a certain event 
(state of affairs) will occur in the future, the prophecy renders that event 
inevitable.
' 
Now S-K are aware of the fact that prima Jacie endorsing (2) commits them 
to the undesirable result that biblical prophecy threatens human freedom in 
the sense that 
(D) All prophesied human actions in the Scriptures tum out to be inevitable, 
and hence are unfree in the sense of freedom required for moral respon-
sibility. 
They propose two ways of dealing with this difficulty. The fIrst way is to say that 
Rl. Biblical prophecies involving human actions are stated in a general way, 
and hence do not render any particular action of an agent inevitable.s 
As an example, they mention the following prophecy from the book of Daniel. 
"And in the latter time of their kingdom, when the transgressors are come to 
the full, a king of fierce countenance, and understanding dark sentences shall 
stand up. And his power shall be mighty, but not by his own power: and he 
shall destroy wonderfully, and shall prosper and practise, and shall destroy 
the mighty and the holy people." (Daniel 8: 23-24) 
This prophecy which is of the form: 
It will be the case that some king performs some action at some time, 
leaves vague the identity of the king. the place and time of his action, etc., 
and hence fails to identify a particular action of the agent. To be sure, we do 
have in the Scriptures also prophecies which are less vague, prophecies of 
the form: An agent S will perform an act of type V, during the time-interval 
T. E.g., 
"Yet within three days shall Pharaoh lift up thine head, and restore thee unto 
thy place: and thou shalt deliver Pharaoh's cup into his hand after the former 
manner when thou wast his butler." (Genesis 40:13)9 
But such prophecies too, claim S-K, need not render inevitable any particular 
action of the agent. Thus, instead of restoring the chief butler to his former 
office in the way he actually did, Pharaoh could have refrained from perform-
ing that particular act, and done the restoring at a different time, or at another 
place, or he could have done it using different words.lO 
S-K's second response to (D) is to reject it by claiming that 
R2. Although a prophecy may render the prophesied act inevitable, this does 
not imply that it renders the act unfree. ll 
S-K back this contention by suggesting the following account of the notion 
of a free action. 
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(FSK) An action A is afree action of an agent S, just in case: 
FA 1. The volition on which S acts in doing A is an instance of free 
will on S's part. 
FA2. In doing A, S is doing what he wants to do when he wants to do 
it. 
A volition is an effective desire or want which moves the agent all 
the way to action. 
A volition V is an instance of free will just in case: 
FWI. V is not causally determined; and 
FW2. V is S's own volition. 
These two conditions are to be understood, according to S-K, in the following 
way: (FWl) V is not causally determined only if V is not the result of an unbroken 
causal sequence that (a) originates in something other than S's own beliefs and 
desires and that (b) makes V unavoidable for S. (FW2) V is S's own only if (a) 
S's intellect represents the state of affairs that becomes the object of V (under 
some description) as a good to be pursued by S at that time and (b) S forms V 
in consequence of that representation on the part of S's intellectP 
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Thus, to count as a free action, according to S-K, an action need not be 
avoidable. 13 What is needed is that it stem from a volition that is an instance 
of a free will and satisfy FA2. Such a volition itself may, of course, be 
avoidable. But S-K stress that it need not be, i.e. its being unavoidable is, 
according to them, compatible with its being an instance of free will. 14 
II 
I turn now to the examination of these two responses to (D). Consider first 
Rl. It amounts, as we can see, to the claim that biblical prophecy does not 
threaten the avoidability of the prophesied action qua particular action or 
qua act-token. Now how exactly does this claim provide an answer to the 
problem posed by (D)? If it is meant to be a refutation of (D), then it does 
not succeed, since it is compatible with (D). The reason for this is that RI 
focuses on the avoidability of an act qua act-token, whereas the unavoidabil-
ity intended in (D) is that of an act under a given description, the description 
of the act as specified in the prophecy. IS In other words, (D) was not intended 
to mean that if there is a prophecy to the effect that an agent S will perform 
an act of type V during T, then the act-token satisfying OS's V-ing during T' 
is unavoidable, but rather that it is unavoidable that S will V during T. But 
perhaps S-K intended RI to be a response to (D) only from the vantage point 
of the avoidabilist, i.e., someone who takes avoidability to be a necessary 
condition for freedom and moral responsibility, thus subscribing to 
(PAP) A person is morally responsible for an action he performed only if 
he could have avoided performing it. 
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That is, perhaps S-K's intention was to claim that, though they themselves 
reject avoidabilism, the problem I raise in connection with (D) can be an-
swered even by an avoidabilist? Of course, if this line of argument is to be 
successful, it must be supplemented by the assumption that, contrary to what 
is assumed by (D), the sort of avoidability required for an agent's moral 
responsibility for his act is that of the act qua act-token. But would this 
assumption be acceptable to an avoidabilist? The answer is negative. When 
concerned with moral responsibility we are concerned with questions of 
moral praise and blame. Now an agent is morally blameworthy for an act he 
performed only insofar as that act was of a type that is morally wrong (i.e., 
of a type such that it is morally wrong to perform an act of that type). This 
means that from the point of view of the avoidabilist the issue of an agent's 
being morally blameworthy for his act hinges crucially on the question 
whether in the circumstances the agent could have refrained from acting in 
a morally wrong way. Clearly, then, for the avoidabilist the notion of avoid-
ability that is pertinent to moral responsibility is not that of an action qua 
act-token, but rather that of an action under a given description, the descrip-
tion in virtue of which the act may be deemed morally right or wrong. This 
last point can be also brought out by the following example. Suppose that 
Jack was hypnotized to kill Smith on August 7, at 5:32 pm, and in fact did 
so. Suppose also that the time mentioned is the exact time of the action. 
According to the avoidabilist, Jack would not be morally blameworthy for 
killing Smith. Given the hypnosis, he could not have refrained from perform-
ing a morally wrong act. But note that qua act-token his act was avoidable. 
For instead of strangling Smith, as he actually did, Jack could have killed 
him in some other way, e.g. by stabbing him, and that would be a different 
act-token from the one he actually performed. 
A perhaps more plausible version of S-K's first response from the point of 
view of the avoidabilist would be the following: 
Rl'. Biblical prophecies are stated vaguely in that they do not specify 
the exact time of the prophesied action. Consequently, a prophecy 
of the form "S will perform an act-type V during the time interval", 
though rendering it inevitable that S will V during T, need not render 
inevitable S's V-ing at T', where T' is the exact time at which S V-s 
during T.16 
On this account, a prophecy issued on August 1/92, saying that 
(3) Jack will kill Smith on August 7/92, 
renders it inevitable that Jack kills Smith on August 7/92. But it need not 
render inevitable Jack's killing Smith at 5:32 pm, on that day; and Jack may 
still be held responsible for the latter. The problem, however, with this pro-
posal is that it does not work for prophecies involving omissions. For con-
sider, for example, a prophecy (issued on February 1/92) which says that 
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(4) Jack will not kill Smith on March 1/1992. 
If a particular instantiation of Jack's not killing Smith on the said date were 
avoidable, say his not killing him at 5:32 pm, it would follow that it was 
within Jack's power to kill Smith on March 1. But this would be in contra-
diction with the alleged inevitability of (4). In other words, the assumption 
underlying Rl', that the unavoidability of a given dated state of affairs does 
not entail the unavoidability of a temporally more determinate state of affairs 
of the same sort, does not hold for omissions. And since we do have in the 
Scriptures many examples of prophecies involving omissions, Rl', as a gen-
eral thesis regarding biblical prophecy, is false.17 
Let us consider now S-K's second response to (D), R2. As noted earlier, 
the idea behind it is to resist (D) by maintaining that inevitability does not 
imply lack of freedom in the sense of freedom required for moral responsi-
bility. This latter sort of freedom, according to S-K, is captured by (FSK) and 
does not require avoidability or freedom to do otherwise as a necessary 
condition. On this view, although an action may be rendered inevitable by a 
certain prophecy, it might still be an action for which the agent may be held 
responsible; for it may stem from a volition which is an instance of free will 
on the agent's part. To be sure, the problem of reconciling divine foreknowl-
edge with human freedom, as it is usually raised, is formulated in terms of 
freedom in the sense of freedom to do otherwise. And, indeed, it was this 
notion of freedom that I was concerned with in my paper. Still, the move 
made by S-K in R2 is an interesting one, and it behooves us to see whether 
it provides the eternalist with an adequate response to my objection to the 
Eternity Solution. 
Its ingenuity notwithstanding, R2 proves unsatisfactory. One weakness of 
it is that it leads to consequences that are theologically suspect. Imagine, for 
example, that God reveals to some prophet that when no one will be around 
Jack will severely harm Billy, who is an innocent child. Suppose further that 
Jack does so willingly for the sake of fun, and that his volition to do so is 
avoidable. (This last assumption is justified in view of S-K's explicit stipu-
lation that, on (FSK), the fact that an action is inevitable does not imply that 
the volition on which the agent acts is inevitable.) Then, it follows, given the 
alleged inevitability of the prophesied action, that Jack would find himself 
harming Billy, even if he had resolved not to do so. This consequence seems 
to me problematic taking into account God's essential goodness and wisdom. 
To point to a related difficulty, consider God's prophecy to Moses that the 
King of Egypt will not let the Israelites go (Ex. 3: 19). By considerations 
similar to those cited above, it can be shown that even if Pharaoh had made 
the opposite decision, he would be prevented from carrying it out, and would 
still have to return a negative answer to Moses. This would go against the 
standard view that, at least in his first encounters with Moses, Pharaoh had 
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a choice as to whether or not to let the Israelites go. IS Or, to take a case from 
the Christian theological tradition, consider Jesus's well-known prophecy that 
Peter will deny him three times. "And Jesus saith unto him, Verily I say unto 
thee, this day, even this night, before the cock crows twice, thou shalt deny 
me thrice" (Mark 14: 30). Again it can be shown that, on the account sug-
gested by S-K, Peter would have to deny Christ even if he had resolved not 
to deny him.19 Consequences like these seem to me to be theologically im-
plausible. In response to this objection S-K may argue that if Peter had not 
willed to deny Christ, then Christ, knowing this, would not have told Peter 
that he would do so. (Similarly also in Pharaoh's and in Jack's case.) But this 
would be to attribute to Peter power over the past. For if the fact of Christ's 
telling Peter about the latter's denial is contingent upon whether or not Peter 
wills to deny Christ, then Peter, by having the power to refrain from willing 
to deny Christ, can be said to have the power to bring it about that Christ did 
not reveal to him in the past what he in fact did.20 
But R2 is open to a more serious criticism. We have seen earlier that in 
their formulation of R2 Stump and Kretzmann employ a notion of freedom 
that is independent of avoidability. This move enabled them to claim, contrary 
to (D), that the fact that a prophecy renders the prophesied action unavoidable 
does not imply that it renders it unfree (in the sense of freedom pertinent to 
moral responsibility). But notice that once the meaning of 'free action' has 
been changed in this way, the Eternity Solution loses its significance as a 
bona fide solution to the freedom-divine omniscience problem. For when 
faced with the incompatibilist argument, it is open now for the proponent of 
foreknowledge to reply that all that this argument shows is that divine fore-
knowledge is incompatible with the agent's act being avoidable, but not with 
its being a free act in the sense of (FSK). Thus, there is no need to embrace 
the Eternity Solution in order to solve the freedom-foreknowledge problem. 
Indeed, the problem does not arise in the first place. The only response that 
I can envisage at this point, on behalf of S-K, would be to claim that a God 
who has foreknowledge would also foreknow the agent's volitions and this 
fact would render the agent's actions unfree in the sense of (FSK). I.e. 
(5) If God were to foreknow an agent's volition to perform a certain action, 
the action associated with that volition would not be a free action. 
But such a claim is far from being self-evident. To see this, let us examine it 
more carefully. Let A be a given act of Jack, and let VA be the volition on 
which Jack acts. Also, let us assume that condition FA2 of S-K's account of 
free action is satisfied, i.e., that in doing A, Jack is doing what he wants to 
do when he wants to do it. (This assumption is certainly consistent with God's 
foreknowing VA.) Now if, as (5) implies, God's foreknowing VA renders his 
action unfree, then it must be the case that condition FAI of their account is 
not satisfied, which means that VA is either causally determined, or that it is 
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not Jack's own volition in the sense that it is not formed as a consequence of 
Jack's intellect representing the object of VA as a good. In other words, the 
plausibility of (5) requires the truth of 
(6) If God foreknows VA, then either VA is causally determined, or VA is 
not Jack's own volition. 
But why should one accept (6)? Why couldn't one conceive of a possible 
world in which although God foreknows VA, VA is not causally determined 
is Jack's own volition? First, God's foreknowledge of VA does not seem to 
contradict the fact that VA is Jack's own volition. As Stump points out else-
where, when VA is an agent's own volition, the intellect moves the will not 
as an efficient cause but as a final cause.21 And this fact seems to be compat-
ible with God's foreknowledge of VA. Secondly, why assume that 
(7) God's foreknowing VA entails that VA is causally determined. 
This claim is extremely controversial. It would, for example, be rejected by 
many theological compatibilists who believe that at least some of our voli-
tions or actions, though foreknown by God, are not causally determined. 
Finally, even if (7) were true, one may wonder why a similar claim does not 
hold for God's atemporal knowledge, in which case, the appeal to a God who 
exists outside time would prove useless for solving the freedom-foreknowl-
edge problem. 
III 
In concluding my discussion of Rl and R2, I would like to comment briefly 
on a recent criticism of these responses by Edward Wierenga.22 Wierenga 
argues against Rl that it does not work for prophecies which describe the 
agent's activity in considerable detail. In such cases, he claims, general in-
evitability implies particular inevitability. So for example, in a case where a 
prophecy prophesies that 
(3) Jack will kill Smith on August 7/92, 
and where 
(3a) Jack's particular action of killing Smith, 
occurs at 5:32 pm, on that day, Wierenga's view is that the (alleged) inevita-
bility of the former implies the inevitability of the latter. His argument for 
this contention is the following: Either (3) is rendered inevitable by way of 
some causal or deterministic mechanism, or it is not. If it is, then that mecha-
nism would also render inevitable Jack's actual killing of Smith at 5:32 pm. 
If it is not, then he cannot see how (3) can be deemed inevitable. Hence, 
according to him, Rl is false. Wierenga employs a similar argument also 
against R2. He claims that if, as shown above, the inevitability of Jack's 
actual killing of Smith requires the existence of some causal mechanism that 
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renders the killing inevitable, then that very same mechanism would also 
render inevitable the volition associated with the killing, in which case, the 
killing would not be a free action in S-K's sense (i.e., in the sense of FSK). 
Consequently, the claim made in R2 that an action might be inevitable, and 
yet be a free action is implausible.23 In my view, both these arguments by 
Wierenga are questionable. First, assuming that there is some causal mecha-
nism M that ensures the inevitability of Jack's actual killing of Smith at 5:32 
pm, it does not follow from this that M also causes Jack's volition to kill 
Smith. For the action in question may be overdetermined by both the volition 
and M. Secondly, I wish to claim that a state of affairs such as (3) may be 
inevitable without there being at work any causal mechanism that renders 
Jack's actual killing of Smith at 5:32 pm inevitable. To see this we only need 
to conceive of a situation in which the inevitability of (3) is guaranteed by 
the existence of some agent B who is such, that were he to detect that Jack 
does not kill Smith until 10:00 pm on August 7, he would force Jack to do 
so immediately thereafter. In such a situation, if Jack kills Smith on his own 
at 5:32 pm, then despite the fact that (3) is inevitable, Jack's actual act of 
killing Smith need not be causally determined.24 
IV 
Can the eternalist formulate an adequate reply to my objection to the Eternity 
Solution? In my original article,25 I made it clear that my objection was 
intended against a specific type of eternalist position; one that treats the 
principle of the fixity of the past, PFP, as a conceptual truth and views the 
move of conceiving of God as existing outside time as a way of avoiding the 
violation of PFP to which the incompatibilist argument leads. We can, how-
ever, imagine also a different version of eternalism (call it "eternalism2") that 
does not presuppose the truth of PFP. The proponent of this version is open-
minded with regard to possible violations of PFP, provided he can account 
for them, i.e., provided he can explain how in the specific case the agent can 
be said to have power over the past, without assuming backward causation. 
Now the eternalist2 does have a reply to my objection which, in my view, is 
non-trivial and is worth considering. When faced with the conclusion of the 
objection to the effect that 
it was within Jack's power at T4 to bring about the non-obtaining of a past 
fact such as XT3: That Smith heard at T3 a voice telling him that Jack will 
attempt to kill him, 
the eternalist2 might claim that in the case of XT3 the violation of PFP is 
harmless. The reason for this is that XT3, unlike regular past facts such as 
e.g., Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939, has as one of the conditions which 
are causally necessary for its obtaining an atemporal fact that Jack has power 
over, i.e., God's knowing that Jack attempts to kill Smith at T5, etc. And since 
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Jack has it within his power to bring about the non-obtaining of that fact, he 
also can be said to have it within his power to bring about the non-occurrence 
of XT3. More generally, the strategy that may be adopted by the eternalist2 
when it comes to the question whether an agent can be said to have the power 
to bring about the non-occurrence of a past fact (event) F is to ask how that 
past fact came about. If its occurrence is partially due to the obtaining of an 
atemporal fact, there seems to be no reason why someone who has the power 
to bring about the non-obtaining of that atemporal fact may not be credited 
with the power to bring about the non-occurrence of F. These considerations 
lead to the following amendment of the principle of the fixity of the past from 
the point of view of the eternalist2: 
(PFP1) For any fact F, time T, and agent S, if F is a genuine fact about the 
past, relative to T, then, unless S has at T power over an atemporal 
causally necessary condition of F, it is not it within S's power at T 
to bring about the non-obtaining of F. 
Conclusion 
S-K's proposal of how an eternalist might escape the objection I raised to the 
Eternity Solution appears to commit them to the theologically undesirable 
result of having to treat all prophesied human actions in Scripture as unavoid-
able, and hence as unfree. In this paper, I have examined two attempts by 
S-K to respond to this difficulty. Their first response turns out to be either 
irrelevant to it, or else involves an assumption that is unacceptable to the 
avoidabilist, i.e., that moral responsibility for an act requires its avoidability 
qua act-token. As for their second response, we saw that, aside from being 
subject to theological difficulties, it employs a notion of freedom that is 
irrelevant to the divine foreknowledge-freedom conflict as traditionally for-
mulated, and one for which this problem does not arise. As a result, the 
Eternity Solution loses its significance as a bonafide solution to that problem. 
A defence of the Eternity Solution that renders it superfluous in this sense 
would be self-defeating from the eternalist viewpoint. Lastly, I outlined what 
seems to me to be the most promising line of defense that an eternalist might 
adopt to deal with the objection I raise. To be sure, this line involves weak-
ening the principle of the fixity of the past. However, since it achieves this 
weakening in a non-arbitrary way, it is a position that is worth exploring.26 
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